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This paper explores the complex nature of narrative authority in J.M. Coetzee’s Age of Iron, set in an apartheid South Africa at
a moment of extreme political crisis. At first glance, it seems as though Mrs. Curren’s ability to comment on and judge the events
of the Emergency is constantly undermined, as Coetzee appears to deliberately place her in a marginalized position that cannot
claim any real authority over the events she witnesses. However, reading the novel through the critical lens of Coetzee’s 1996
essay on Erasmus’ In Praise of Folly, it appears that in this novel Coetzee is in fact in search of a position from which one may tell
the truth from the outside, without inserting oneself into the rivalrous binary of political oppression and resistance that implies
an unavoidable taking of sides (i.e. that of Folly itself). In the end, however, Coetzee is forced to admit that this privileged position
of objective truth-telling may not in fact exist, that it is only through the subjective discourse of storytelling – a discourse, however,
that is no less authoritative for its being a wholly personal act of witnessing – that one can speak the truth. Key words: “ek-
stasis”, authority, alterity, storytelling.
Benita Parry, in her contribution to the anthology Writing South Africa, criticizes J.M.
Coetzee for his disengagement from the “politics of fulfillment” in his novel Age of
Iron (Parry 1998: 162). She argues that by presenting the narrative in the voice of
Elizabeth Curren, a white ex-academic speaking from a position of “entrenched cul-
tural authority,” Coetzee fails to subvert the domination of European textual power
in colonial discourse (Parry 1998: 151). For Parry, Mrs. Curren’s voice is constantly
associated with cultural supremacy, while the victims of subjugation in the novel are
represented by a silence, a voicelessness that she finds disturbing (Parry 1998: 158).
Coetzee is therefore guilty of repeating the very exclusionary colonialist gestures that
he himself criticizes, of a silencing of the other that is the unfortunate norm in the
chronicle of white South Africa (Parry 1998: 150,163).
The objections that Parry raises, while perhaps extreme, are important to consider
in discussing the issue of narrative authority in Age of Iron. Terminally afflicted with
cancer, almost entirely isolated from the historical reality in which she inches ever
closer to death, Mrs. Curren does not appear qualified to pass judgments of right and
wrong on either the black revolutionary movement or the brutally repressive policies
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of a South African state in extreme crisis. Her denunciations seem to lack any real
authority. Yet is this position outside of the conflict (though Mrs. Curren is at times
only too present as a spectator at the scene of its enactment) one that is incapable of
producing a valid judgment? Is the source of a judgment really the determining
factor in its inherent truth value? This question of narrative authority is one with
which Coetzee struggles throughout Age of Iron, and one to which it is difficult to
locate a definitive answer within the text.
An informative departure point for an exploration of Coetzee’s somewhat ambig-
uous treatment of Mrs. Curren’s authority is an essay which appears in the collection
Giving Offense: Essays on Censorship, published nearly six years after Age of Iron. Here
Coetzee writes about Foucault’s unsuccessful attempt to return authority to the dis-
course of madness, of which he (Foucault) identifies two distinct types. One is given
to rivalry and is “certain of its own righteousness,” while the other is problematic in
that it seeks a position that is external to both conflict and reason from which to pass
judgment (Coetzee 1996: 93-94). Coetzee describes the second type of madness, the
kind present in Erasmus’ Praise of Folly, as “a kind of ek-stasis, a being outside one-
self ”, in which one speaks the truth from a position (i.e. that of Folly) that does not
know itself to be that of truth (Coetzee 1996: 95). Any assertion made in the name of
Folly is inherently suspect to begin with, as is this position outside rivalry that Folly
claims for itself. Indeed, Coetzee identifies an “inherent self-defeatingness” in Eras-
mus’ text, showing how this external discourse, once it has achieved any sort of
authority, is by default re-inserted into the discourse of political rivalry that it strives
to avoid. As Coetzee puts it, in embracing the position of the fool “the power of that
position reveals itself, the paradox dissolves, and the rivalrousness of the project is
revealed (…) the little phallus grows, threatens the big phallus, threatens to become a
figure of law itself” (Coetzee 1996: 98). (Here the “big phallus” refers to the phallocen-
tric discourse of reason, law, and rivalry.) The impossibility of this position, however,
is not grounds for criticism as far as Coetzee is concerned. In fact, the position of ek-
static madness that Erasmus posits is one that greatly attracts Coetzee. This
(im)possibility of telling the truth from outside, of refusing to include oneself in the
larger discourse of binary rivalries, is a central concern of much of Coetzee’s fiction.1
While the character of Mrs. Curren cannot simply be read as a reincarnation of
Erasmus’s Moira (Folly herself), Coetzee’s essay can be profitably used to explore the
questions of authority that Age of Iron raises in reference to its narrative voice. For
example, the fact that Coetzee’s narrator is a woman, as well as the fact that mother-
hood is one of the novel’s central themes, tempts one to associate Age of Iron with the
discourse of the “little phallus” (see Ravindranathan 2004). On the other hand, the
fact that Mrs. Curren’s narrative often seems consciously, if not physically, inserted
into the historical reality of the Emergency, makes it difficult to argue that the “big
phallus” occupies a position of merely secondary importance in the novel. More
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central to the concerns of this essay, however, is Mrs. Curren’s (already mentioned)
position as spectator to the events of the Emergency and as mouthpiece for the West-
ern literary/critical tradition, a position which it can be argued is not one of cultural
authority, but of marginality. In reading Age of Iron through the lens of Coetzee’s later
essay, one should keep in mind Mrs. Curren’s assertion that “there is madness in the
air here” and attempt to figure out which kind of madness she (or Coetzee) refers to
(117).
Mrs. Curren’s physical remove from the urgent reality of the emergency state is
clearly set-up early in the novel. By characterizing her letter as “words committed to
the waves: a message in a bottle,” she calls up the image of an island castaway, isolated
from the rest of humanity (32). Apart from the tramp Vercueil, who goes and comes as
he pleases, her only consistent connection to the outside world is the television,
through which she peers as if “down a pipe” at the world outside (27). Yet Mrs.
Curren knows that the state broadcasts she tunes in to, the ones that present “a land of
smiling neighbors” while glossing over or simply omitting reports of violence and
social unrest, cannot be trusted to give an accurate portrayal of external reality (54).
Ultimately, as Mrs. Curren admits, she has access only to second-hand accounts of
what passes in the townships: “What I know about events in Guguletu depends
solely on what Florence tells me and on what I can learn by standing on the balcony
and peering northeast; namely, that Guguletu is not burning today, or, if it is burning,
is burning with a low flame” (39).
Events on the frontlines are seen in the distance and therefore the force of their
real existence can hardly be present for Mrs. Curren. She may as well be watching
them on the television. Admittedly, Mrs. Curren herself realizes that her position is
almost hopelessly detached from the events of the real, acknowledging that she must
fight constantly to “keep up a sense of urgency” (119). Similarly, when Mrs. Curren
attempts to remonstrate with Mr. Thabane over the phone, her voice is described as
“very tiny and very far away,” implying its lack of impact on and authority over the
issues it discusses (149). Mr. Thabane’s seemingly innocuous comment emphasizes
Mrs. Curren’s marginality and puts her in her place, that of an outsider looking down
the wrong end of a telescope. As she writes to her daughter: “it seems hardly possible
to believe there is a zone of killing and degradation all around me. It seems like a bad
dream” (119). Significantly, a dream is something that, while it may affect one as real
as long as it lasts, is ultimately woken up from and therefore left behind when the
light of day once again bathes life in its warm, comforting glow. A dream exists in
reality only within the subconscious, not with the immediacy of concrete presence.
But does her admitted detachment from the events she describes and on which
she passes judgment serve to neutralize Mrs. Curren’s authority as an author? Or is
Mrs. Curren’s position, as Coetzee allows his readers to obliquely infer from her
musings on Hesiod’s age of iron, the only one from which to comment on “a time out
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of time, heaved up out of the earth, misbegotten, monstrous”? (50). Can she be seen as
occupying a position external to the primary, rivalrous discourse, the kind of position
that Coetzee so admires in Erasmus’ satirical text? Is she actually telling the truth “ek-
statically,” from the outside, perhaps all the while unaware that she is doing so? One
is at least a little tempted to grasp at such an optimistic reading, as does David Attwell
in his response to Parry’s criticism of Coetzee. Attwell acknowledges the “tenuous
historical position” in which Mrs. Curren finds herself, but points, as I have, to the
suspension of historical time into which her narrative is allowed to insert itself, ena-
bling her to give alterity the social density that Parry finds lacking in her reading of
the novel (Attwell 1998: 175).
However, apart from the impossibility of this enterprise that Coetzee himself iden-
tifies in his treatment of Erasmus’ project, such a reading of Age of Iron is called into
question for two significant reasons. First, Mrs. Curren’s cocoon-like state is shattered
when she drives Florence to one of the squatter camps outside Guguletu and witness-
es firsthand the violence that is being perpetrated in the streets. Furthermore, she is
repeatedly unable to find words with which to denounce the injustice she bears
witness to. Not only is she repeatedly left speechless, but the words she is eventually
able to produce with her pen are hedged about with self-doubt. Even Mrs. Curren
acknowledges herself to be a dubious source of judgment in this place and time.
Confronted with the reality of life in these camps, the reality of a life and death
struggle being waged every day, Mrs. Curren is at a loss not only for answers, but for
words themselves. When prompted by Mr. Thabane to speak of the things she has just
witnessed, Mrs. Curren falters, replying: “These are terrible sights (. . .) They are to be
condemned. But I cannot denounce them in other people’s words. I must find my
own words. Otherwise it is not the truth. That is all I can say now” (98-99). The
words may exist, but they do not come readily from her mouth. In response to some-
one’s comment that “this woman talks shit,” all Mrs. Curren can do is agree, pleading
with the crowd that “to speak of this (. . .) you would need the tongue of a god” (99).
The image that such a phrase calls up, however, of the noble fields of Ilium trans-
planted onto the dirt streets of the township, is one that seems completely out of place
when the woman who has created it is uncomfortable uttering the word “heroism,”
the very word that such a comparison calls for (165).2 This is an example of the “liberal-
humanist” posturing of which Mrs. Curren acknowledges herself guilty (85). There is
no god there to speak the words that must be spoken. Thus the invocation of this
classical image where it has no place seems simply to undermine any claim to author-
ity made by a discourse rooted in Western literary tradition.
This misapplication of Western classical tradition is a recurring theme in Age of
Iron. For example, when Mrs. Curren attempts to remonstrate with the young revolu-
tionary John, she tells him: “if you had been in my Thucydides class (. . .) you might
have learned something about what can happen to our humanity in time of war” (80).
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In addition to the obvious racial and financial impossibilities of this situation, Mrs.
Curren ignores the fact that John could perhaps teach her something of what hap-
pens “to our humanity in time of war.” By suggesting that what John has experienced
so viscerally (indeed, she speaks to him as he lies in a hospital bed) can best be studied
at a centuries-long scholarly remove is an absurdity. Coetzee recognizes this absurdi-
ty, as does John: “he knew and he did not listen, just as he had never listened to any
of his teachers” (80). The suggestion in this scene is that, at least for the moment, the
time for scholarship has given way to the time for action, the irony of this revelation
is deepened by the fact that Thucydides himself was primarily a great man of action.
It is Mrs. Curren who here transforms him into a detached observer of human nature.
Moreover, the lesson that Mrs. Curren claims to read in Thucydides is without mean-
ing in the context in which she speaks, saying: “it is a great pity when we find
ourselves entering upon times like those. We should enter upon them with a sinking
heart. They are by no means to be welcomed” (81). There is no comfort in these words,
nor is there an exhortation to courageous action and self-sacrifice, only the banality of
capitulation and resignation. Mrs. Curren’s message of pity is indicative of withdraw-
al and a certain detached hopelessness, and as such is a perversion of what Thucy-
dides should in truth be used to teach. How then can John be expected to learn from
a classical tradition whose teachers offer nothing more than despairing misinterpre-
tations? Mrs. Curren’s recourse to classical Greece, far from identifying her with a
position of cultural dominance, serves to undermine her speaking authority even
further than her physical detachment from the political struggle has already done.
Mrs. Curren’s repeated misapplication of Western cultural and literary paradigms
to her South African surroundings suggests a peculiar failure of imagination on her
part. Her interpretation of events is not essentially unimaginative; it is simply that
her imagination seems consistently to lead her in the wrong direction, away from a
direct confrontation with the reality she is struggling to come to terms with and
towards a casting of events and persons in a light that only creates shadowy misun-
derstandings. In reflecting on the peculiar names of Florence’s children, Hope and
Beauty, Mrs. Curren observes that “it was like living in an allegory” (90). She forgets,
however, her previous admission that the only reason she knows the girls by their
allegorical names is that Florence “does not entrust me with the real name[s]” (37).
Mrs. Curren’s allegory is therefore empty, pointing not to any deeper meaning but to
a lack of inclusion and comprehension on her part. It is also interesting to note that
while Mrs. Curren can imaginatively transform Florence into the classical image of “a
Spartan-matron,” even that of the goddess Aphrodite, she must in the end admit that
Florence, flanked even by the allegories of Hope and Beauty, would be singularly
unimpressed by her proposed self-immolation (141).
How could it be that this act of symbolic suicide, an act which seems to be the most
authoritative one open to Mrs. Curren, would still fail to impress Florence, and by
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implication all African observers/judges? While self-immolation is not a classically
Western trope, in its ties to an Eastern tradition it is still perhaps hopelessly removed
from the South African context in which it would occur. Furthermore, if we continue
to read Mrs. Curren’s narrative as aiming at a kind of ek-stasis, then would not such a
public act of political defiance negate that possibility altogether? Would not the spec-
tacle of her burning body reinsert Mrs. Curren’s discourse (both her written dis-
course as well as the symbolic discourse of her suicide) into the rivalrous binary in
which one asserts one’s own righteousness from the very heart of the conflict?
It seems that Mrs. Curren herself anticipates these or similar objections when
explaining to Vercueil why she ultimately does not go through with the suicide.
Making an analogy to Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter, she asks him:
These public shows, these manifestations – this is the point of the story – how can
one ever be sure what they stand for? An old woman sets herself on fire, for
instance. Why? Because she has been driven mad? Because she is in despair? Be-
cause she has cancer? I thought of painting a letter on the car to explain. But what?
A? B? C? What is the right letter for my case? And why explain anyway? Whose
business is it but my own? (114)
Unable herself to give a definitive explanation for this contemplated suicide, Mrs.
Curren ultimately decides that death is a private matter, to be undergone and inter-
preted away from the gaze of the masses. Furthermore, she shies away from this
public exhibition because it is not an act over which she can exercise complete au-
thority. In offering her burning body to the public she will be giving them a symbol,
but not one whose interpretation she can comfortably regulate. As the comparison
with Hester Prynne’s famous marking suggests, the ungrounded allegory of this
hypothetically labeled act would give the observer (the reader) an interpretive free-
dom outside of authorial control. Mrs. Curren, then, apart from an obvious aversion
to ending her own life, is reluctant to offer herself up in a manner that is not wholly
on her own terms. She refuses to allow herself, even in death, to be swallowed back
up by the phallocentric discourse of binary political and social rivalry that self-im-
molation would inevitably fuel. By ultimately refusing to act without authority, re-
fusing to insert herself (her death) into this realm of the “big phallus”, Mrs. Curren
may indeed preserve the tenuous claim to an authority outside itself that we see
Coetzee toying with elsewhere.
Yet what authority does a failure to act, for that is what Mrs. Curren’s rejection of
public suicide ultimately is, command? And what of her failure to speak? Along with
its invalidation through the misapplication of foreign cultural tradition, Coetzee also
continues to show Mrs. Curren’s narrative authority being undermined by a physical
inability to speak. One such scene occurs when she visits Guguletu and confronts the
white soldiers stationed there, soldiers who have presumably killed Florence’s son,
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Bheki. Wanting desperately to denounce their acts in some meaningful way, Mrs.
Curren is at a loss for words, “bereft of speech,” mute (105). In the end, all she can offer
is a hollow warning that nothing can be “worse for yours souls” than what these
young men are doing, an admonition that carries no weight except for she who
speaks it (107). As Mrs. Curren herself observes, she is living in a “time not hospitable
to the soul,” thus undermining her own appeal to such a concept as the basis for just
action (130). Similarly, her words of caution to the white policemen: “I am watching
you (. . .) I am watching everything you do,” are not enough to stop them from killing
John, the young revolutionary who has taken refuge in her backyard servant’s quar-
ters (153).3 Through this series of events, Mrs. Curren is portrayed as a mere spectator.
She sees and records, but lacks the agency to act in any significant way. Even when
present, she is still somehow removed from the events transpiring before her very
eyes. Referring to this detached position, Mrs. Curren reflects that “to have opinions
in a vacuum, opinions that touch no one, is, it seems to me, nothing” (163).
But could this vacuum in which Mrs. Curren feels herself located actually be the
position of Folly, a position from which one speaks the truth without knowing it?
Does the very fact that opinions in a vacuum carry no weight (as Mrs. Curren ob-
serves) keep them safe from that insertion into a rivalrous binary that Coetzee can be
seen avoiding at every turn? Again, one is tempted to return to Coetzee’s essay on
Erasmus in order to locate some kind of authority in Mrs. Curren’s narrative. After all,
why would Coetzee want to present us with a narrative voice that lacks authority? Is
he testing us, and if so are his musings on Folly the right place to look for clues to a
possible answer?
David Attwell does not look to Coetzee’s piece on Erasmus in his reading, but his
interpretation of the novel’s problems of authority does indeed counter much of
what Parry has said. Attwell takes these reflections of Mrs. Curren’s as indicative of
what he calls ‘polyphony without reciprocity,’ recognizing that while Mrs. Curren’s
is the only voice present in the narrative, there is an unmistakable “self-consciousness
about alterity” in Age of Iron. He sees Mrs. Curren making several efforts to “engage
with what she understands to be the life-world and subjectivity of those who are
socially distant from her” (168). Two of the examples that Attwell cites of this “effort to
engage” with alterity are Mrs. Curren’s visit to Florence’s husband’s workplace and
her subsequent imagination of their life at home in the township. Her insistence that
what she describes in a fictional account of their Sunday afternoon “must have hap-
pened” (43) is for Attwell an argument against “an alterity so radical that there are no
grounds for intersubjective recognition” (Attwell 1998: 170). Attwell sees Coetzee as-
serting the ability of fiction to refuse to accept the dogma of absolute difference “which
has been the bane of everyone’s existence in South Africa” (Attwell 1998: 170).
Another instance of Mrs. Curren’s conscious registering of alterity comes when
she looks at an old family photograph taken in her grandfather ’s garden in 1918.
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Remembering the garden, she is suddenly struck by the realization that the beauty
she recalls with such nostalgia was not the work of her grandfather, but that of un-
seen hands. “If not he, then whose was the garden rightfully? Who are the ghosts and
who the presences? Who, outside the picture, leaning on their rakes, leaning on their
spades, waiting to get back to work, lean also against the edge of the rectangle, bend-
ing it, bursting it in?” (111) The native gardeners are not seen in the photograph, but
their presence is something that the child of two may even then have been dimly
aware of. These men hover on the boundary of this particular picture just as they
hover around the edges of South Africa’s idealized pastoral history.4 They represent
the marginalized other with whom Attwell sees Mrs. Curren struggling to identify in
Age of Iron. Yet can this moment qualify as an example of “polyphony” with or with-
out reciprocity, or does it somehow fall short of even that? As she reflects at greater
length on the photograph, Mrs. Curren lapses into the Latin text of one of the most
famous melodies of the Gregorian chant:
Dies irae, dies illa when the absent shall be present and the present absent. No
longer does the picture show who were in the garden that day, but who were not
there (…) the fixing did not hold or the developing went further than one would
have ever dreamed – who can know what happened? – but they have become
negatives again, a new kind of negative in which we begin to see what used to lie
outside the frame, occulted (111-112).
Skipping forward to the “day of wrath” on which absence and presence will reverse
themselves, Mrs. Curren envisions a photograph in which the “occulted” existence of
her grandfather ’s black workers will be restored, their claim to the land reinstated
while their white masters fade away to the blurred edges of the frame. But what
authority, one must ask, does this imagined restoration of presence possess? In ac-
knowledging the work of occlusion that the original photograph does, can Mrs.
Curren really be said to restore these marginalized figures to a place on the film of
history? And even if she does succeed in returning them to our field of vision, how
can these forgotten laborers, retrieved by her mind alone, be anything more than
mute presences? What becomes of these native voices when their bodies are brought
back from outside the rectangle and reinserted into our consciousness? And does this
reclamation in fact rob these shadowy figures of their own ek-static position of judg-
ment? If anything is certain here, it is that while Mrs. Curren is perhaps successful in
awakening her reader to the presence of these occluded men, she cannot speak for
them, cannot give voice to their judgment, whatever it may be. Attwell is right to see
Mrs. Curren engaged in a constant searching after an “other,” but the fact remains that
her attempts at dialogue with this marginalized presence appear limited, incomplete.
Her instinct is correct, but her approach (note again in her slip into Latin the recourse
to a Western literary and religious tradition) somehow repeatedly misses the mark.
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Perhaps the most forceful example that Attwell cites of Mrs. Curren’s successful
“commerce with alterity” is her act of writing herself into the final moments of young
John’s life before he is shot by the police in her backyard. She imagines a moment in
which “we face, first he, then I, the great white glare” of the sun, and of the gunfire
that snuffs out John’s life. Interestingly, Mrs. Curren observes that “his eyes are open
and mine, though I write, are shut. My eyes are shut in order to see” (175-176). Attwell
interprets the paradoxical image of this blind writing as raising “Coetzee’s emphasis
on allowing writing to circumvent prevailing socio-economic conditions and to as-
sert an alternative frame of reference,” thereby judging Mrs. Curren’s attempt to write
John’s last moments as a successful one (Attwell 1998: 171). There are other possible
interpretations, however. For example, could Coetzee be suggesting that the act of
creative imagination requires a sort of focus inward, a closing of the eyes to what is
external to composition, but at the same time implying a certain blindness to the
reality of this external world? In addition, it is important to note that this apparent
moment of solidarity comes only in retrospect, after John is dead. This temporal
distance, along with the fact that in life John repeatedly resists Mrs. Curren’s attempts
to reach out to him, makes it difficult to read this as a moment of shared conscious-
ness. Mrs. Curren’s (re)writing of John’s final moments seems not to be an instance of
successful identification with the other, but rather an imposition of her own con-
sciousness of impending death onto this other.5
One may in fact read the text of Age of Iron as leading inevitably to the death of its
narrator, as an act of writing that is meant to prolong the coming of death, but cannot
defeat it altogether. The novel/letter ends with the image of Vercueil as the Angel of
Death, locked with Mrs. Curren in a final embrace. “I got back into bed, into the
tunnel between the cold sheets. The curtains parted; he came in beside me. For the
first time I smelled nothing. He took me in his arms and held me with mighty force, so
that the breath went out of me in a rush. From that embrace there was no warmth to be
had” (198).
How does one read this passage? Is it simply Mrs. Curren envisioning the moment
of her death and concluding her letter in the way that seems most appropriate, or is it
possible that these final words are indeed spoken/written from a position beyond
death? Could this in fact be the ultimate space of ek-stasis, a space outside of binary
rivalries precisely because it is outside life itself? Speaking from a position beyond
death, one would presumably be able to claim access to a higher truth than that
possessed by any other discourse. Moreover, such an interpretation has significant
implications for our reading of the rest of the text as well, since one may choose to
read any number of other moments as recorded ek-statically once this possibility has
been established. There are, however, certain problems with assigning Mrs. Curren
this rather desirable narrative position. Mainly, if her text is really a letter that is meant
to be sent on to a daughter in America, then such a posteriori additions can only be
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made if Vercueil has not in fact complied with her request and mailed the letter. We
do not know the fate of Mrs. Curren’s letter because it is a detail that lies outside of the
text we are given, a detail which could perhaps have been cleared up if its author did
indeed continue to write after passing away. Taken most optimistically, then, this
final passage appears to be no more than a glimpse of the ek-static position that Co-
etzee is so drawn to, a position which can perhaps be attained for a fleeting moment
but in the end proves unsustainable.
In treating this question of narrative authority in Age of Iron, it seems to me that
Michiel Heyns is closest to the truth in his 2002 article on “An Ethical Imperative in
the Postcolonial Novel.” Heyns sees Mrs. Curren (and by extension Coetzee) in the
difficult situation of writing in an attempt to delegitimate the culture of which they
themselves are part (Heyns 2002: 107). He reads Mrs. Curren’s frequent inability to
speak as a failure to comprehend the dueling “cultures of survival” that dominate the
political landscape of her existence. She is unable to negate her own cultural ideology
in order to come to terms with the cultural Other. Heyns focuses on Mrs. Curren’s
description of a time outside of time, “misbegotten and monstrous”, as indicative of
an ethical void that ungrounds the liberal-humanist notion of humanity in which
her thinking is unavoidably rooted, claiming that the novel is quite aware of its
narrator’s limitations, but is unable to take us past them (Heyns 2002: 108-109). For
Heyns, then, Age of Iron represents a work of ethical imagination, an “act of faith in the
face of despair,” in that it presents a world beneath good and evil (like Hesiod’s age of
iron), in which the ethical imperative of respect for the demands of the other is
insufficient (Heyns 2002: 113).
It appears that Heyns is on the right track. Coetzee does indeed seem to be “testing
the limits of the liberal-humanist engagement with suffering” on an intellectual level
and finding this engagement somehow lacking (Heyns 2002: 109). Yet what other
options are available to a writer like Coetzee, notoriously reclusive and un-political?
It seems clear that Coetzee is not making a strong claim for the truthfulness or author-
ity of Mrs. Curren’s narrative, but he is far from denouncing her attempt to write
herself into an understanding of what is going on around her (and despite of her). It
is an effort that Coetzee would very much like to see succeed. In the end, however, he
is forced to admit the inadequacy of speaking from the position of Folly, a position
which knowingly, even laughingly undermines its own authority in the face of the
horrific events of the Emergency, events whose condemnation cannot be open to
mockery.
If authority does reside within any given discourse, then, it seems that for Coetzee
this discourse must be that of storytelling. All ethical claims aside, Coetzee recognizes
that the discourse of storytelling occupies a privileged position, allowing certain
experiences to remain in an eternally-lived present instead of being the glossed over
and filed away by historical discourse. As Mrs. Curren writes to her daughter:
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I tell you the story of this morning mindful that the storyteller, from her office,
claims the place of right. It is through my eyes that you see; the voice that speaks
in your head is mine. Through me alone do you find yourself on these desolate
flats, smell the smoke in the air (. . .) It is my thoughts that you think, my despair
that you feel (. . .) To me your sympathies flow; your heart beats with mine (103).
The object of storytelling is not to produce an objective record of events, but to trans-
port the reader to a specific place and time, seen and experienced through a single
consciousness. Mrs. Curren recognizes the authority that she claims in the very act of
writing, not an authority over objective truth and historical reality, but an authority
over her own story. This is not quite the position of Folly, for it recognizes its own
place and makes its claim to truth quite explicitly. For Coetzee, the discourse of story-
telling must refuse to be swallowed up by that of history, must maintain an autono-
mous position from which to transcend the binaries of historicist thinking and offer
a faithful account of lived experience.6 Storytelling, as Coetzee conceives of it, con-
sciously establishes its own rules, and therefore demands the right to be judged on its
own terms. If we accept this position, Benita Parry’s criticism becomes unfounded. In
telling a story, Coetzee is not obligated to undermine traditional colonial discourse, is
in fact perfectly free to refrain from overtly entering the forum of rivalrous socio-
political debate if he so chooses. Read as an attempt to capture and pass judgment
upon the events of the Emergency, we must admit that Mrs. Curren’s letter can never
be wholly successful. If, however, we read her letter as an exercise in storytelling, an
exercise driven by the very personal encounter with an other which she is perhaps
never fully able to come to terms with, then we cannot deny Mrs. Curren’s narrative
a certain authority. It is not the problematically delegitimized authority of the West-
ern or European cultural tradition, but the authority of a marginalized, single voice,
a voice whose admitted subjectivity paradoxically enhances the compelling nature of
the text it produces.
Notes
1. See Samuel Durrant’s essay on “Bearing Witness to Apartheid: J.M. Coetzee inconsolable Works of
Mourning.” Durrant argues that in texts such as Waiting for the Barbarians and Life and Times of
Michael K Coetzee actually engages apartheid by keeping a certain distance from its material,
historical reality. His narrators are never fully inserted into their own narratives, existing instead as
“figures of and for alterity,” at the fringes of historical reality and therefore presenting the loss and
suffering of apartheid as “untranslatable” and impossible to transcend through literature (Durrant
1999: 432, 434). By refusing to enter the past-present binary that allows one to exorcise the materiality
of history, Coetzee offers only the possibility of “living through history” indefinitely (460).
2. Mrs. Curren herself acknowledges that “what the times call for is something quite different from
goodness. The times call for heroism,” but admits that this is “a word that, as I speak it, sounds
foreign to my lips. I doubt that I have ever used it before, even in a lecture” (165). The “hero with
his heroic status” is, as far as Mrs. Curren is concerned, no more than an “antique naked figure”
who is out of place in the world about which she writes (166).
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3. Mrs. Curren admits that when she tells John: “I won’t let them hurt you, I promise”, it is a lie. The
truth is, as she herself confesses, that “he was lost, I had no power to save him” (152). Indeed, both
Mrs. Curren’s words and actions are equally ineffectual. She can do nothing more than watch and
listen as John is killed.
4. For a discussion of the occlusion of black labor from the genre of the pastoral in South Africa, see
Coetzee’s introduction to White Writing.
5. Ravindranathan (2004: 8) agrees that “her a posteriori identification with John prior to his death is
to no small extent informed by her consciousness of the proximity of her own death,” adding that
“an identification with the Other is enabled only via the fragility and liminality of the anticipation
of death. It is difficult to view this as an authentic form of dialogue with the Other; it is, at most,
self-reflexive”.
6. For a longer discussion of the relation between the discourses of literature and history, see Co-
etzee’s 1987 address, “The Novel Today,” given at the Weekly Mail book week in Cape Town. Here
Coetzee claims that literature must refuse to accept a supplementary relation to the discourse of
history, that it must strive to “demytholog[ize]” historical discourse and its traditional claim to
primacy (Coetzee 1988: 3).
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